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SUMMARY
Medico-legal death investigation systems have the potential to play an important role in disease
surveillance. While these systems are in place to serve a public function, the degree to which they
are independent of central government can vary depending on jurisdiction. How these systems
use this independence may present problems for public health initiatives, as it allows death
investigators to decline to participate in government-led surveillance regardless of how critical the
studies may be to public health and safety. A recent illustration of this problem in the UK is
examined, as well as general lessons for removing impediments to death investigation systems
participating in public health research.
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Introduction
In most developed countries there is a system in place
for investigating both cause and circumstances of
sudden and/or unexplained deaths. In nearly all such
jurisdictions death investigation is a statutory func-
tion and is inherently both medical and legal in scope.
Generally, the determination of the cause of death is a
strictly biomedical issue, while a determination of the
circumstances of death is based upon an investigative
process deﬁned under the law.
Death investigation, beyond fulﬁlling the purely
legal requirement that deaths be appropriately certi-
ﬁed, has the potential to contribute a great deal to
disease surveillance (for both cause-speciﬁc and all-
cause mortality) and public health research [1–5].
Many death investigations require the collation of
an individual’s social, behavioural and medical
history in addition to standard demographic data.
This documentation, in addition to information
collected at the post-mortem examination, has the
potential to yield important data, not only relating to
mortality, but to morbidity as well.
Medico-legal post-mortems are performed at the
request of the principal death investigator and do not
require consent. They are intended to ascertain those
facts pertaining to the death that are directly related
to the death investigation process deﬁned in law.
Consented post-mortems are conducted at the request
of the deceased in advance of their death, or by the
next-of-kin; these investigations are not limited to the
ascertainment of the cause of death and may instead
focus on understanding disease processes and the ef-
fects of clinical intervention. The recent decline in
consented post-mortems has been well documented
in the literature [6, 7]. In most countries the number
of medico-legal post-mortems performed vastly
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outweighs that of consented procedures. Thus, death
investigators may have jurisdiction over a proportion-
ately large number of bodies thereby making these
investigators an essential point-of-contact for re-
searchers requiring access to post-mortem infor-
mation and/or material.
Death investigation systems, which operate under
the purview of a government department, may be re-
quired by the director or minister to participate in
government-led research projects. However, when a
death investigation system is located outside of cen-
tral government, and is aﬀorded the sort of indepen-
dence normally reserved for the judiciary, it may be
the prerogative of the death investigator to decide if
s/he will participate. Thus, the viability of a disease
surveillance study often does not depend upon the
feasibility of the study itself ; it is contingent on the
willingness of the death investigator to participate –
or the government’s ability to direct such partici-
pation [8].
The importance of disease surveillance and
post-mortem tissue to public health and safety
Disease surveillance is absolutely essential to con-
trolling threats to public health and safety. It is the
primary means of : measuring the impact of these
threats, detecting changes in incidence and preva-
lence, monitoring preventive and control measures,
highlighting intervention priorities, building evidence
for costing studies and providing aetiological clues
about emergent diseases [9]. Complete and accurate
reporting is essential in situations involving bio-
terrorism-related agents [10] and
highly contagious diseases for which contact tracing is re-
quired, serious infections such as botulism and rabies ; and
some new diseases such as variant CJD, very rare diseases
which are not necessarily preventable, but for which more
information is required, and conditions for which public
health measures such as quarantine/isolation, chemopro-
phylaxis, vaccination or immunoglobulin are necessary
[9, p. 15].
Some disease surveillance initiatives rely either en-
tirely or in part on material collected at post-mortem.
The vast majority of post-mortems are performed as
part of a medico-legal death investigation and are
done so under the direction of the principal death in-
vestigator (e.g. the coroner) who eﬀectively has do-
minion over post-mortem data and tissue (including
documentation pertaining to the death). In England
and Wales, for example, more than 95% of post-
mortems are performed at the request of the coroner
which, in 2009, represented 105354 post-mortem
examinations [6, 11].
Disease surveillance studies (including prevalence
surveys), which are intended to measure the preva-
lence of rare conditions, may be particularly depen-
dent upon data from medico-legal post-mortems as
large sample sizes are crucial to the precision of
prevalence estimates. As consented post-mortems
generally show a skewed age distribution they may be
entirely unsuitable for surveillance studies that rely on
a representative sample. Thus, the participation of the
death investigator becomes integral to the implemen-
tation of any large-scale disease surveillance pro-
gramme based upon post-mortem data requiring a
representative sample.
Elsewhere it has been suggested that the advance-
ment of public health and safety is one of the main
purposes of a medico-legal death investigation [2, 4,
12–14]. This fact is evident in the many disease sur-
veillance studies that have been successfully im-
plemented within death investigation systems. For
example, systems in the USA have participated in
various public health and safety initiatives including:
the Medical Examiner and Coroner Alert Project
(involving fatalities and commercial products), the
Drug Abuse Warning Network, the Fatal Accident
Reporting System, Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries, the Food and Drug Administration’s adverse
drug and medical device fatality reporting system, and
the National Violent Death Reporting System [2, 4].
In England andWales, a few individual coroners have
sought consent from families to retain DNA for a
sudden arrhythmic death syndrome study [15] and, in
Scotland, the chief procurators ﬁscal agreed to par-
ticipate in the Medical Research Council’s Sudden
Death Brain and Tissue Bank project [16].
Independence of death investigation systems
While many disease surveillance studies are initiated
by central government, the implementation of these
initiatives is often delegated to other government
agencies or to subordinate levels of government. In
1993, for example, the Minster of Health and the
Attorney General for British Columbia, Canada ap-
pointed the Chief Coroner to conduct an inquiry into
heroin-associated deaths in the province, which re-
sulted in the ground-breaking and controversial
Report of the Task Force Into Illicit Narcotic Over-
dose Deaths in British Columbia [17]. Cooperation
between government oﬃcials is expected and, indeed,
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necessary for the execution of such studies. Thus, if
central government administers a death investigation
system, there are few barriers to implementing disease
surveillance programmes beyond issues of funding
and feasibility. The same is not true for systems of
death investigation that are outside of the direction of
central government. When a public organization,
such as a death investigation system, is largely inde-
pendent from government control, there are few
means through which government can compel such
organizations to participate.
Death investigation systems can take various
forms – depending on the jurisdiction – and can be
administered by a coroner, medical examiner or
procurator ﬁscal, as well as by the military or police.
These systems may vary in terms of, for example, the
qualiﬁcations of the primary investigator, the method
by which the relevant information about a death is
determined, and the means through which the system
maintains legitimacy. Death investigation systems
maintain diﬀerent degrees of independence from
central government. Some systems aﬀord paramount
value to substantive independent inquiry (e.g.
England, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Republic of
Ireland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jamaica), situating
the death investigation system within the judicial
branch. Other systems, particularly medical examiner
systems in North America (e.g. Alaska, Alberta,
Delaware, Manitoba, North Carolina, Nova Scotia,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia),
are aﬀorded procedural independence, although the
executive and/or legislative branches of government
retain a considerable degree of administrative control.
In England and Wales, coroners consider them-
selves independent judicial oﬃcers whose allegiance
lies not with government but with the Crown. Their
appointment and remuneration is the responsibility
not of central government, but of local authorities
[18]. The coronial system relies on the formal inquest
as the primary method through which the cause and
circumstances of deaths are determined. In systems
such as this, and in many derivative coronial systems,
the primary death investigator is generally a lawyer
or, in some cases, a judge who presides over the
inquest, which is conducted in a court setting. The
justiﬁcation for treating coroners as independent
judicial oﬃcers is that it constitutes an important
safeguard for society and its citizens (i.e. it oﬀers an
independent investigation of deaths precipitated by
state oﬃcials or in state custody) [18]. In England
and Wales, however, the executive or legislative
branches of government have no authority to instruct
the death investigator in matters pertaining to the
investigation, or to require that they participate
in disease surveillance programmes or public health
research.
An alternative to near absolute independence from
government is a death investigation system situated
within a government department or ministry. In these
systems the death investigator’s statutory function –
the investigation of the cause and circumstances of
reported deaths – is provided substantive indepen-
dence from central government. The investigator’s
non-statutory functions are, however, subject to over-
sight by the ministry or department through which
they are administered. The primary death investigator
is considered a ‘quasi-judicial investigator ’ and con-
ducts investigations ‘ independent from all law en-
forcement agencies and health authorities ’ [19]. In
such systems, the ministry has the authority to direct
the Chief Coroner/Medical Examiner to implement
policies provided they do not compromise the death
investigator’s independence when it comes to the ex-
ecution of the death investigator’s statutory function.
In addition, when a death investigation system falls
under the auspices of a government department it is
bound by the mandate of that department or ministry,
which imposes a certain duty on the investigator par-
ticularly when that mandate, for example, explicitly
implies a duty to ‘protect the living’ [20]. Under such
death investigation systems, it is much more likely
that disease surveillance programmes can be success-
fully implemented and that public health and safety
will be promoted.
The abnormal prion protein survey in England
and Wales
One recent example from the UK provides a poignant
illustration of how important, well-intentioned and
suﬃciently funded public health initiatives can fall
victim to a death investigation system that puts its
independence from government ahead of protecting
public health and safety.
In light of new evidence that variant Creutzfeldt–
Jakob disease (vCJD) had the potential to emerge
as a second-wave infection resulting from human-
to-human transmission, the UK Health Protection
Agency (HPA) proposed the creation of a post-
mortem tissue archive to study the prevalence of ab-
normal prion protein (a marker for vCJD infection) in
the UK [21]. The study required tissue from a large
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number of post-mortems, necessitating the partici-
pation of coroners in England and Wales. Following
a protracted correspondence of over a year – and
despite eﬀorts by the HPA to accommodate the cor-
oners’ concerns – the Coroners’ Society of England
and Wales (CSEW) declined to participate in the
study, citing various issues including its putative le-
gality, cost and feasibility. The CSEW concluded that
to participate in the study would, ‘adversely aﬀect the
independence of the coronial service and would fur-
ther erode public conﬁdence’ [22].
Elsewhere, we have argued that concerns over the
study’s legality, cost and feasibility were misplaced
[23]. The HPA and Chief Medical Oﬃcer provided the
CSEW with ways to participate in the study that
would alleviate or mitigate such concerns. The driving
consideration appeared to be the CSEW’s concern
that an agency of central government was attempting
to direct them in the conduct of their duties, and that
eﬀorts to have them participate in this research proj-
ect posed a threat to coronial independence. Without
the participation of coroners, this study has become
entirely unfeasible, as there is no other realistic way to
obtain the necessary tissue. The HPA, and other
government committees, such as the Spongiform En-
cephalopathy Advisory Committee, continue to try to
ﬁnd ways of conducting further research to determine
the prevalence of abnormal prion protein in the UK
population; however, all subsequent options are
methodologically inferior to the study as it was
originally proposed.
One of the primary reasons given for the import-
ance of coronial independence in modern times stems
from the coroner’s role in meting out the govern-
ment’s procedural obligation under Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to
protect the right to life. What is problematic is that it
appears the CSEW has interpreted this obligation in
negative terms, and seems to view any direction from
a government agency as a possible threat to its inde-
pendence. Given that government policy in the UK
was deemed complicit, at least in part, in the initial
outbreak of vCJD [24], and that the proposed
vCJD study was intended to control the spread of
iatrogenic infection through medical and dental pro-
cedures made available by the state, it could reason-
ably be argued that the vCJD study also fulﬁls the
government’s obligation to protect life under the
ECHR. Article 2 not only requires that member states
not deprive life, but also imposes the positive ob-
ligation to, according to Lord Bingham, ‘establish a
framework of laws, precautions, procedures and
means of enforcement which will, to the greatest ex-
tent reasonably practicable, protect life ’ [25]. The
participation of coroners in the vCJD surveillance
programme should be understood as contributing to
the observance of Article 2; however, it would seem
the independence that is deemed necessary for the
protection of human life has become an end unto
itself – one much divorced from the principle upon
which it has been granted.
Conclusion
The above case provides a vivid illustration of some of
the problems that can result for disease surveillance
and public health research in jurisdictions where the
independence of the death investigation system is
given supreme priority. Independence is not an end it
itself – it is a means by which such systems are pro-
tected from the possibility of undue inﬂuence or nef-
arious interference by central government. It is the
independence from central government that is sup-
posed to ensure that death investigation systems can
perform their statutory and non-statutory duties.
Death investigation systems should be structured in a
way that the value of the independence we accord to
them in fulﬁlling their function does not become an
impediment to the government’s obligation to protect
public health and safety.
The independence of death investigation systems
from central government is important for a number of
reasons. However, since death investigation systems
with substantial independence are not directly
answerable to central government, they cannot be in-
structed to participate in any disease surveillance
programme regardless of how crucial it is to the pro-
tection of human health and safety. Coroners in, for
instance, England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and
Hong Kong are not required to participate in any
public health and safety initiatives owing to their in-
dependence from government, nor are they required
to provide justiﬁcation for not doing so. This presents
a serious concern for obtaining useful epidemiological
data and employing successful programmes to pro-
mote and protect public health. Systems currently
ﬁelding the possibility of reforming existing death in-
vestigation systems (e.g. the Republic of Ireland,
India, Singapore, Jamaica) should be wary of valuing
independence to such a substantial degree that it can
become an impediment to government-led public
health and safety initiatives.
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